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Abstract: The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical compari-
son between two views. According to the ﬁrst, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to
the second, they are propositions. We ﬁrst isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the
second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work
of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of
these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the
ﬁrst view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the
view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under
certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of
reasons.
Keywords: reasons, propositions, states of affairs, unity of reasons, Jonathan Dancy
1. Introduction
REASONS ARE NO DOUBT IMPORTANT. They are important in our everyday life: we
customarily refer to reasons when we explain our actions as well as when we try
to justify what we plan to do, or what we did. Reasons are also important in con-
temporary analytic philosophy. In a recent book, Thomas Scanlon (2014,
pp. 1–2) points out that reasons have become the focus of philosophical research
in at least two ways. First, there is currently more interest in normativity and rea-
soning spelled out in terms of reasons than in morality. Second, there is more
interest in reasons than in motivation – that is, in what morality or prudence
demand rather than in what moves one to act in the way one does.
The present article follows this trend and focuses on a somewhat neglected part
of the debate: the ontology of practical reasons. That is, the question we are con-
cerned with is what kind of things reasons for action are. When we say that you
have a reason to jump off the tracks because the train is coming, what is your rea-
son? That the train is coming, the coming of the train, or perhaps your belief that
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the train is coming? According to Jonathan Dancy (especially in his Practical
Reality), the answer is clear: one’s reason is the second on the list, namely, the
coming of the train. Indeed, Dancy argues in no uncertain terms that all practical
reasons must be states of affairs. But why does Dancy say this? Is the view of
practical reasons as states of affairs compelling?
Before embarking on a discussion of these questions, it is essential, ﬁrst
of all, to introduce the distinction between normative and motivating practi-
cal reasons. Normative practical reasons1 are those things that make actions
right or wrong and that, consequently, are referred to in evaluating one’s
actions. Motivating reasons are instead the considerations that ﬁgure in
explanations that point at the reasons for which the agent acted. These are
‘hybrid’ in character: for the agent, at the time of acting, these motivating
reasons appear as normative reasons. Yet, they need not correspond to nor-
mative reasons.2
According to Dancy, normative reasons and motivating reasons must be entities
of the same type – this is what we will call the ‘unity of reasons’ thesis, or UR
for short. Dancy’s master argument for UR consists in his endorsement of the
Explanatory Constraint – normative reasons must be capable of playing the role
of motivating reasons – and the Normative Constraint – motivating reasons must
be able to function as normative reasons (Dancy, 2000, pp. 101–105). The con-
junction of these two constraints, Dancy thinks, provides the grounds for believ-
ing that motivating reasons and normative reasons are ontologically the same
kind of thing.3 Although we are sympathetic to the idea that motivating and nor-
mative reasons may be identical, hence to UR, two things need to be made clear
from the outset: ﬁrst, UR can be implemented in various ontological frameworks
– indeed, while we take no issue with UR, we disagree with Dancy’s claims con-
cerning which ontological category normative and motivating reasons must both
belong to (in Dancy’s case, states of affairs); second, our argument does not cru-
cially rely on UR. In most of the article we discuss Dancy’s position on normative
reasons, and there UR does not play an argumentative role. Only at the end of the
article, when we criticize Dancy’s views by making explicit reference to the ontol-
ogy of motivating reasons, do we make use of UR. But there we will be explicit
1 Sometimes these reasons are called justifying reasons, but we agree with Dancy (2000, p. 107), that
the qualiﬁer ‘normative’ is more appropriate.
2 We are not interested in what Alvarez (2010, p. 36) and Mantel (forthcoming) call explanatory rea-
sons: the reasons that are invoked by agents to explain why they acted in a certain way. Jonathan Dancy,
who will be discussed in what follows, has the same focus. See also Hyman (2015, esp. ch. 6) for a good
discussion.
3 For a thorough (and, ultimately, sympathetic) recent treatment of UR, see Miller (2008) and Alvarez
(2010). Mantel (2014) provides a good critical discussion.
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that our stronger conclusion is conditional on the acceptance of UR, while our
weaker claim holds even if UR is dropped.
We can now turn back to our main question: what sort of things are practical
reasons? Assuming UR for now, the following appear to be the main candidates: that
they are mental states (or facts about mental states), that they are non-mental states
of affairs, and that they are propositions.4 In this article, we will not take issue
with Dancy’s outright disposal of the ﬁrst option, i.e., of what one might call
‘psychologism’, and will focus on his arguments against the third position, which we
label ‘propositionalism’, and in favour of the second, which we will dub ‘statism’.
Of course, as is often the case in philosophy, labels tend to veil a complex real-
ity. In particular, there are many different accounts of all the relevant ontological
categories and, to make matters worse, different authors may work with different
deﬁnitions, and some authors even identify one category with another. Also,
although while assuming UR one may talk about ‘practical reasons’ in a generic
way, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between motivating and nor-
mative reasons, as different conclusions may be reached with respect to each one
of these two categories. Thus, while we will refer to practical reasons (or just rea-
sons) some of the time, we will differentiate between motivating and normative
reasons whenever needed, especially in the concluding part of the article.
As for the ontological categories involved, Dancy paints a straightforward pic-
ture of the ontology of reasons (as we shall show in the next section). Also,
although his account is by no means uncontroversial, it is in many ways an ortho-
dox, mainstream account nonetheless. Thus, it is certainly useful to start a discus-
sion of the ontology of practical reasons with an evaluation of Dancy’s speciﬁc
account. This is what we will do in the rest of the paper.
The remaining part of this article is structured as follows. In the next three sec-
tions (2 to 4) we summarize Dancy’s views and present what we take to be the
most sensible reconstructions of his claims against propositionalism. Moreover,
we suggest ways in which the propositional theorist could respond to those objec-
tions, and critically evaluate these responses. We argue that a careful examination
of the emerging dialectic shows that propositionalism and statism are essentially
guided by conﬂicting fundamental visions of what reasons are and what role they
serve. That is, contrary to Dancy, propositionalism is not obviously inferior to
statism as an account of reasons: instead, it is a theory that should be taken seri-
ously – at least as seriously as statism, at any rate. In section 5, we suggest addi-
tional considerations that we take to tip the balance in favour of propositionalism
4 Turri (2009, pp. 491–492) provides extensive bibliography. What we call ‘propositionalism’ Turri
calls ‘abstractionism’, a difference which is irrelevant for present purposes. See also Alvarez (2016) and
Mantel (2014, 2016, forthcoming) for overviews of the relevant literature.
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(at least under the assumption that motivating and normative reasons belong to
the same ontological category). In section 6, we conclude by summarizing the
main points of the article.
2. Dancy’s Arguments Against Propositionalism
As noted, in his 2000 book Practical Reality Dancy aims to argue that normative
and motivating reasons are the same kind of thing: states of affairs (hence the title of
the book). To do so, using the two constraints we introduced earlier, he ﬁrst rejects
the view according to which normative reasons (what we believe) explain motivating
reasons (beliefs) and these, in turn, explain action. After this, he provides arguments
against the idea that motivating reasons are beliefs with content, while normative
reasons are the contents of such beliefs. Were we to accept such a view, he claims,
we would face the following dilemma. If content is understood to be propositional,
we get an indefensible account of normative reasons. For, Dancy argues, if they are
understood as propositions, normative reasons turn out to be too weak, as it were, to
do their job. If, on the other hand, content is understood along statist lines, we end
up with an outlandish philosophy of mind.5 All this leads Dancy to embrace statism
as a form of practical realism encompassing both motivating and normative reasons.
From this short summary, it is clear that a defence of statism is crucial for
Dancy not only as a position in the ontology of reasons but also, even more
importantly, in the wider context of his overall argumentation. However, his
claims against propositionalism do not qualify as proper arguments. At the start
of his discussion, Dancy appeals to intuitions. He says:
Intuitively it seems to be not so much propositions as states of affairs that are reasons. It is her
being ill that gives me reason to send for the doctor, and this is a state of affairs, something that is
part of the world, not a proposition. (Dancy, 2000, p. 114; emphasis added)
But intuitions can hardly carry the weight of a proper argument, at least in this
context. Even if we consider them as providing prima facie evidence, in such
highly abstract matters as ontology there is good reason not to trust our intuitions
concerning individual cases as conclusive or even obviously persuasive. What is
more, it is far from clear to us that these intuitions are the sort of universally
shared intuitions that Dancy would need to support his position. Exactly the same
holds for Dancy’s claim that reasons are things that can be the case, not things
that can be true, hence propositions are just the “wrong sort of metaphysical
beast” to serve as reasons, because there is a clear ontological gulf between
5 However, in Morganti and Tanyi (ms), we argue that this outlandishness charge might put Dancy
himself in trouble.
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propositions and states of affairs (Dancy, 2000, pp. 116–117). This, again, simply
afﬁrms what needs to be argued for.
As a matter of fact the claims just reported have not been backed up by Dancy
(or anyone else) with a detailed discussion. Indeed, it seems to be regarded as not
calling for extensive treatment.6 Is this because the point Dancy makes is obvi-
ous? Is it because the way he makes it is compelling? We believe that the answer
to both these questions is negative and that, while common sense may pull
towards statism, things are much more complicated once one embarks on a care-
ful philosophical analysis of the issue.
In what follows, we will try to give further substance to these claims of
Dancy’s, and discuss two more explicit objections to propositionalism that we
think can be reconstructed from Dancy’s work once one goes beyond mere
claims concerning what is intuitively the case. The ﬁrst (section 3) is what we
will call Dancy’s Thinness Objection. We will distinguish, and respond to,
three interpretations of this objection. The second (section 4) can be dubbed the
Representation Objection. With respect to both objections we will suggest, and
critically evaluate, several responses. Focusing on those that appear to be the
most philosophically promising while also respecting Dancy’s core commitments
(UR and his general ontological views), we will subsequently move on to a
more general critical assessment of statism as opposed to propositionalism,
providing explicit arguments in favour of the latter.
3. The Thinness Objection
Quoting more fully from the passage mentioned in the previous section, here is
what Dancy says:
Now the question is whether on either account (remembering that both accounts are hotly dis-
puted) propositions are the right sort of thing to be good reasons for action. It seems just obvious
that they are not. For a class of worlds is hardly the right sort of thing to make an action sensible
or right. And an abstract object with a structure that mirrors that of a sentence seems to be no bet-
ter off. On either understanding, propositions are, as we might say, too thin or insubstantial to be
able to make an action wrong. They are the wrong sort of beast. Reasons for action are things like
his self-satisfaction, her distress, yesterday’s bad weather, and the current state of the dollar. They
cannot be abstract objects of the sort that propositions are generally supposed to be. (Dancy, 2000,
p. 116; emphasis added)
The two accounts of propositions that Dancy refers to are what he (plausibly)
takes to be the two dominant accounts. The ﬁrst follows Lewis (1986) and takes
6 The only critical reﬂections on Dancy’s arguments that appeared in print are in Lord (2008), Everson
(2009) and Hyman (2011). Related discussions can be found in Alvarez (2010) and Hornsby (2008).
Alvarez (2016) provides the most recent overview, also including Dancy’s speciﬁc contributions.
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propositions to be sets or classes of possible worlds, namely, those in which the
sentences that express the propositions are true. The second, which follows Frege
(1892), regards propositions as abstract objects whose structure mirrors the struc-
ture of an assertoric sentence.7 Dancy rightly regards propositions on both
accounts as abstract and, although more controversially, as not part of the world
(Dancy, 2000, pp. 114, 116).8 In contrast, states of affairs are entities that obtain
or do not obtain (as opposed to propositions that are true or false). As he also
puts it, they are capable of being the case (Dancy, 2000, pp. 116–117, 146–147),
they are features of the world (Dancy, 2000, pp. 114, 146) or, more speciﬁcally,
features of the agent’s situation.9 Although Dancy is concerned with normative
reasons in the quoted passage, given that UR is in place, the contrast extends to
practical reasons in general and can be summarized as shown in Table 1.
Based on this orthodox contrast between two kinds of entities, Dancy goes on
to argue that practical reasons cannot be propositions and must be understood as
Table 1. (Practical) reasons
Propositions States of affairs
Abstract Concrete
Not in the world (not worldly) In the world (worldly)
Capable of being true Capable of being the case (obtain)
Truth-bearers Truth-makers
7 Dancy notes that there are many competing accounts in the literature, but only focuses on these two.
Although he is right that these are to be considered dominant, there is also a third view that requires con-
sideration. It is based on Russell (1903), according to whom propositions are abstract entities built up
out of objects, properties and relations. It is, moreover, possible to combine different accounts of proposi-
tions in one’s theory. George Bealer (1998), for instance, can be interpreted as having something like the
Russellian and Fregean account of propositions, respectively, in mind when he distinguishes between
connections and thoughts. Gaskin (2009) also has Russellian propositions on the level of reference
(which he refers to as ‘the world’) and Fregean propositions (what Frege called ‘Thoughts’) on the level
of sense. For a good overview of these issues, see McGrath (2014).
8 ‘More controversially’ since, following Wittgenstein, some take the world itself to be abstract. See
Gaskin (2009) for a defence of this view.
9 Interestingly, Dancy does not deﬁne what states of affairs are. Still, we take him to accept the stand-
ard view in the literature: that states of affairs are complexes constituted by objects, properties exempli-
ﬁed by those objects and/or relations between those objects. See Textor (2014) for a good overview.
There is also the important question whether Dancy means states of affairs or facts (or both), where,
roughly, the former may fail to obtain while the latter may not. While the idea that reasons must be
‘worldly entities’ plays a crucial role for Dancy, he also says that states of affairs may obtain or fail to
obtain. Also, his notion of non-factive explanation suggests that for Dancy statements concerning practi-
cal reasons may refer to things that do not obtain. Thus, even though Dancy says at points things like
“facts or, better, states of affairs”, we will assume that it is states of affairs that should be regarded as rea-
sons in Dancy’s view.
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states of affairs. One possible way to interpret this claim is by emphasizing the
contrast between the abstractness of propositions and the concreteness of states of
affairs in the world. Perhaps propositions cannot be practical reasons because
they do not possess the ontological thickness, as it were, to do the sort of things
that practical reasons are supposed to do.10
Let us call this the Thinness Objection (TO). In the rest of this section, we will
consider three possible ways of turning TO into a full-blown argument.
The Thinness Objection as a Metaphysical Objection
A natural interpretation of the above-quoted passage is that Dancy’s suggestion
that propositions are unable to serve as practical reasons has to do with the meta-
physical nature of propositions, namely, with the fact that they are abstract enti-
ties.11 Let us, then, try to substantiate Dancy’s anti-propositionalist intuition
further along this ontological route.
Since TO is formulated with explicit reference to normative reasons, let us focus
on this latter category for now. Following Scanlon (2014, p. 31), we can understand
“is a reason for” as a four-place relation, R(p, x, c, a), holding between a considera-
tion p, an agent x, a set of conditions c, and an action or attitude a. In particular,
p stands in a so-called ‘reason relation’ – or, as it is often referred to: ‘favouring rela-
tion’ – to a. Dancy (e.g., 2004a, ch. 1; 2003, p. 100) clearly accepts this picture of
normative reasons; he is what is sometimes called a ‘primitivist’: he thinks of the
favouring relation as primitive, one that we cannot say anything further about. How-
ever, he also argues that there is a further normative relation in play between p and a
speciﬁc monadic normative property of a – its oughtness. He calls this relation
between reasons and the normative features of actions the ‘making-it-the-case rela-
tion’, or ‘ought-making relation’.12
10 Another possibility is to stress the representational nature of propositions as truth-bearers (Dancy,
2000, p. 117). This is the basis of the Representation Objection, to be discussed later.
11 In the same place, Dancy speciﬁes that it makes no difference to his argument if one focuses on true
propositions, because propositions belong to just one (abstract) entity-type, regardless of whether they
are true or false.
12 The following passage is perhaps the clearest (Dancy, 2003, pp. 106–107): “I think of this contribu-
tory ought as a monadic feature of an action which is consequent on, or resultant from, some other fea-
ture – the ‘ought-making’ feature, whatever it is. So oughts of this sort are not relations. But for them to
be present there must be a certain relation between the ought-making feature and the action. One might
suppose that this relation must be the favouring relation. Things are a little delicate here. I am still
inclined to say that we are dealing with more than one normative relation. The monadic ought is reached
by detaching from the ought-making relation. The train of thought here is ‘Feature F ought-makes action
A; Feature F is in place; so one ought (so far as that goes) to do action A’. This expresses the idea that
the relevant relation is not favouring, but ought-making (or right-making, if you like – so long as ‘right’
does not mean only morally right). So we can stick to our intuition that favouring is a relation between a
feature and an action, and ought-making is a making-the-case relation that holds between a feature and
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Now, the ought-making relation expresses the capability of whatever occupies
the place of the reason relatum – so to call it – to affect the other relatum of the
relation, i.e., a certain action, by modifying its normative features. This leads to
the following interpretation of TO:
1) Propositions belong to the domain of abstract entities;
2) Actions are concrete, worldly items;
3) No abstract entity can affect (the properties of ) a concrete entity;
4) Normative reasons must be able to affect (the properties of ) actions as
concrete entities;
Therefore,
5) No proposition can be a normative reason.
If it is so intended, however, there are possible responses one can formulate to
TO. Three of these can be mentioned brieﬂy, mostly for the sake of completeness,
as they do not appear particularly powerful.
(i) One may attempt to pull propositions and states of affairs as close to each
other as possible: either by making propositions concrete or by rendering states
of affairs abstract. The ﬁrst route might consist in pushing to the extreme the
neo-Russellian view of propositions as structured entities, according to which pro-
positions have semantic values as constituents (a view defended by, among others,
Salmon, 1986 and Soames, 1987). Let us call this ‘radical Russellianism’. Radi-
cal Russellianism, however, would require an implausible shift from propositions
as logical complexes of (possibly) concrete entities – which would in any case be
abstract – to propositions as mereological sums of concrete entities. As for the
other approach, one could embrace some version of the identity theory of truth,
and claim that (true) propositions are identical to states of affairs (that we usually
take to act as truth-makers), and the latter are as abstract as the former (for
details, see Gaskin, 2015). However, this second proposal would entail that even
in a statist scenario the left-hand side of the ought-making relation is abstract
while the right-hand side is concrete. This means that TO would still go through,
now besetting statism itself. In view of this, it seems clear that Dancy is likely
simply to reject the identity theory of truth.
(ii) One may hold that all properties are abstract entities, thus also denying the
supposed concreteness of normative properties as features of actions that take
the (contributory) rightness/oughtness of an action.” It should be added that, as Dancy (2007, pp. 95–96)
makes clear, the favouring relation is intrinsically normative and essentially practical (since one of its
relata is an action), whereas the ought-making relation is only normative indirectly, due to what it does
(that is, endowing an action with rightness/oughtness).
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place in the real world.13 This choice might be given further support by endorsing
non-cognitivism about the normative, that is, the view that normative sentences
do not predicate real properties or, more generally, possess truth-values; or, alter-
natively, by arguing that reasons relate to action-types rather than tokens, hence
to abstract entities. The rationale for this latter claim could be that normative rea-
sons may be invoked when referring to never performed, merely possible actions,
and, more generally, that normative as well as motivating reasons typically appear
in explanations that aim to have general validity, i.e., that are implicitly or explic-
itly regarded as being applicable to other agents and their (possible) actions in
law-like fashion – thus calling type-type relations into play.
However, one may legitimately resist the idea that, when conceiving of some-
thing as a reason, one ipso facto regards it as having general validity. This is,
indeed, very likely to be what Dancy would do, based on his moral particularism.
More generally, being a non-naturalist realist, Dancy also explicitly opposes all
forms of non-cognitivism (see, for instance, Dancy 2006a, esp. sections 6–8).
Moreover, he is clearly against the possibility that the relevant actions and proper-
ties are anything but real and concrete tokens (cf. Dancy, 2009).14
(iii) Another reply to TO might exploit a parallel between practical and epi-
stemic reasons. Epistemic reasons are sometimes taken (Williamson, 2000;
Millar, 1993, pp. 55–65) to be propositions that evidentially support, i.e., speak
in favour of, our beliefs. This means that the epistemic favouring relation is a
normative relation that involves propositions, hence abstract entities, as able to
affect parts of the actual, concrete world, and in particular the having of beliefs
by particular humans. The same may be said to hold for the practical favouring
relation, which relates propositions and the actions of actual agents. On this
basis, one could argue that the ought-making relation too can connect proposi-
tions to (the properties of ) parts of the world (in this case, not the having of
beliefs, but rather the carrying out of particular actions). More strongly, parity
between epistemic and practical reasons and between favouring and ought-
making might be said to require a uniﬁed ontology of normative reasons as
abstract entities.15
13 For an overview of the ontology of properties, see Orilia and Swoyer (2016).
14 Also, note that it is by no means obvious that the generalizations involved in the formulation of gen-
eral laws indicate that the relevant entities are abstract types rather than concrete tokens. In fact, it can
reasonably be contended that general claims are only useful tools that hold ceteris paribus, and only par-
ticulars are truly relevant. That there are no laws, nor general facts, out there, but only Humean regulari-
ties involving speciﬁc objects and events is, for example, not an uncommon idea at all in the philosophy
of science. See Nanay (2013) for an explicitly particularist view of scientiﬁc laws.
15 This might chime particularly well with views of normative reasons that take them to be evidence
of what one ought to do (Kearns and Star, 2009).
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However, in this case too things are far from straightforward. First (as done by,
e.g., Turri, 2009), one may reject for independent reasons the Williamson–Millar
perspective, which is certainly not the common consensus in epistemology. Sec-
ond, one may point out that propositions evidentially support belief-contents,
hence abstract entities, but not the possession of beliefs themselves. Third, espe-
cially if s/he agrees with Dancy’s moral particularism, the statist could claim that
ought-making is a resultance relation (see Dancy, 1993, pp. 73–77; 2004a,
pp. 17–28; 2004b, p. 232) expressing dependence between property-tokens, while
favouring is a form of supervenience which expresses dependence between
property-types. This difference would obviously undermine the parity argument
above. Lastly, one could accept the parity intuition but point out that the argu-
ment can perfectly be run to reach the opposite conclusion: that is, to argue that,
since for independent reasons, provided by TO, propositions cannot stand on the
left-hand side of the ought-making relation, we are forced to deny that the favour-
ing relation can accommodate propositions as actors.
(iv) The most promising response to TO is, we believe, one that takes issue
with the crucial claim of inefﬁcacy directly. The key question here is what kind
of determination the advocate of TO has in mind. To begin with, suppose –
implausibly – that it is causation. Propositionalists could maintain that proposi-
tions can in fact determine normative properties causally, as they are only abstract
in the sense that they lack spatio-temporal location, causal inertness not being
necessary for abstractness, at least on some accounts.16 More importantly, it is
not at all clear that the statist is in any way better off when it comes to alleged
causal powers. For, it is far from obvious that states of affairs have causal powers
towards the normative domain, except maybe in some particular physicalist set-
tings that cannot, of course, be taken for granted: (particular) actions are certainly
physically real, but can the same be said about oughtness or wrongness?
Considering this, it seems legitimate to conclude that the sense of determina-
tion relevant here is different from causal determination, and statists had better
agree with propositionalists on this point. One might contend that this is obvious,
and at no point did Dancy suggest an opposition between statism and proposition-
alism in terms of causal versus non-causal relations (and corresponding explana-
tions). This is probably the case. But it is also the case that, once causality is
explicitly ruled out, the situation becomes much less clear-cut. For instance, one
can argue that the ought-making relation is just a form of grounding – a connec-
tion between facts based on modal dependence supporting counterfactuals and
counterpossibles, which underpins metaphysical explanation. But grounding is
16 For a general discussion of abstractness and its exact deﬁnition, see Rosen (2014). Hoffman and
Rosenkrantz (1997) is also useful.
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deﬁnitely different from causation17 and, more generally, is taken to connect (facts
involving) various types of entities, with no limitation to concrete entities on both
sides. Thus, invoking it might sufﬁce to ﬁll the ontological gap, as it were,
between propositionalism and statism.
The Thinness Objection as Having to Do with Value
Another possible interpretation of TO is suggested by Everson (2009, p. 29), who
reads Dancy as pointing to the fact that something can be a normative reason only
if it has valuable aspects, that is, if it possesses good (or bad) features, but proposi-
tions do not have such a direct connection with value. If this is the right interpreta-
tion of Dancy’s objection, however, the latter seems to be ineffective. For, Everson
himself argues – to our minds correctly – that, even if they are not directly valua-
ble, abstract entities can be connected to valuable aspects of parts of the concrete
world. In other words, normative reasons need not be identiﬁed with such parts of
the world and can simply be in some – perhaps peculiar – connection to them such
that those world-bits become relevant for our actions and the related judgements of
value. This is a crucial point, which we will say more about in section 4.
The Thinness Objection as Having to Do with What We Care About
One may also argue as follows. The way in which we act is determined by what we
care about. In sound practical deliberation that leads to action or at least intention,
we weigh up what we care about in a way that has, or at least may have, normative
power. This means that what we care about and the normative reasons we have
should be one and the same thing. But, of course, what we care about are concrete,
worldly things, not abstract entities (most of the time, at any rate). Thus, Dancy is
right that propositions are the wrong type of things to be normative reasons.
This objection is easiest to understand from the ﬁrst-person perspective. Sup-
pose that someone was in a trafﬁc accident and suppose I could help her. Why
should I? According to propositionalism, the reason would be some abstract
object – the true proposition, say, that the person is injured and needs help. How-
ever, more intuitively, one would want to say that I should help that person
because the person is injured and needs help and this is the thing that I care about
and would subsequently refer to in my sound reasoning to this normative conclu-
sion. But this ‘thing’ is a feature of the situation, a state of affairs (which
obtains), not a proposition.18
17 If the recently burgeoning literature on ground – see Bliss and Trogdon (2014) for an overview –
has clariﬁed anything, it is exactly that metaphysical explanations are broader in scope than strictly
causal explanations (we say ‘strictly’ causal because it is an object of discussion whether grounding
could be considered a sort of metaphysical causation).
18 Beaulieu (2013, p. 446) explicitly promotes this idea as the best defence of statism.
© 2017 Stiftelsen Theoria
195CAN REASONS BE PROPOSITIONS?
We think that this is a forceful interpretation of TO, and one that raises an
important point. But we also think it indicates the way propositionalists should
go in order to make sense of their view and truly vindicate it as a respectable con-
tender. The basic idea is the same as the one expressed in the previous sub-sec-
tion, and will be expanded upon in the ﬁnal part of the article. To be sure, what
we care about, like what we deem valuable, is, most of the time, things in the
concrete world. But it is still possible that it is something else that allows us to
get in touch, as it were, with these worldly things and, based on this, guides our
sound deliberations that lead to (normative conclusions about) our actions – thus
qualifying as our normative reasons for those actions. In particular, one could
claim that the only way for (obtaining) states of affairs to ﬁgure in sound reason-
ing (in fact, in any kind of reasoning) is through propositions; and that it is this
crucial mediating role of propositions that undersigns their role as normative
reasons.19
Before elaborating on this, however, let us discuss the second explicit objection
to propositionalism that can be reconstructed from Dancy’s writings, a critical
assessment of which we take to lead in the same direction. This second objection
has to do exactly with the mediating role of propositions just mentioned.
4. The Representation Objection
Dancy’s second objection against propositionalism is introduced in the following
passage:
One consideration that supports this claim is that anything that has a truth value must be in some
way representational, since for something to be true things must be as it represents them as being.
But no representation can as such be a good reason for anything. The existence of the representa-
tion can be, and so can its having other features (such as lewdness, for instance), and so can its
being the case that things are as here represented. But all these things are states of affairs and not
themselves representations of anything. No representation is the case, and no representation can be
a good reason. (Dancy, 2000, p. 117)
Let us call this the Representation Objection (RO).
Like TO, RO does not receive further support in Dancy’s book and conse-
quently needs some ﬂeshing out. To start off with, it is helpful to consider the
idea of transparency. Representational things are transparent: we always look
through them to see what they represent. Now, in the present case, the idea seems
19 Compare Darwall (1983, p. 31): “While a person may cite the weather or the reluctance of her car
as a reason for her to take the subway across town, it is because these items ﬁgure in what might be said
or thought in favour of her taking the subway, such as that it is raining cats and dogs or that her car will
not start.” Alvarez (2010, p. 42) and Raz (1975, p. 17) also cite a similar thought – that reasons must be
capable of being premises in practical reasoning – as a good motivation for endorsing propositionalism.
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to be that when we look for normative reasons we do not stop at propositions,
but move directly to the states of affairs they represent. That is, propositions are
transparent, hence redundant in a crucial sense, as they fall out during one’s quest
for normative reasons. In view of this, Dancy’s (2000, p. 117) talk of an ontologi-
cal gulf between things that are capable of being true and things that are capable
of being the case can be made further sense of: on the present construal, RO
amounts to the claim that propositions cannot be normative reasons because, by
necessity, they always and exclusively play the role of mediators between agents
and what constitutes a normative reason for them to act in speciﬁc ways
(i.e., states of affairs).
Indeed, so understood, Dancy’s objection is not unprecedented. Dennis Stampe
(1987, pp. 337–338, 342–344), for instance, has argued in a similar way against
the Davidsonian (Davidson, 1980) idea that desires are normative reasons because
they aim at what is of value in the world. Stampe maintains that mental states that
aim at value or truth are best understood as reasons per objectum. That is, it is
valuable states of the world, not mental states related to them, that provide us
with normative reasons to act. The same holds for beliefs: if beliefs, as many
claim, aim at the truth, they cannot be normative reasons. It is the states of affairs
that they are about and that make them true or false that constitute such reasons.
Put in this context, RO would simply carry this line of reasoning to its endpoint:
being representational, propositions cannot be normative reasons.
The question is, of course, whether this simply reiterates the statist intuition, or
instead represents an argument that effectively puts propositionalists in trouble.
As a matter of fact, there seem to be (at least) two responses open to the proposi-
tionalist aiming to undermine RO.
(i) One option is to give up the idea that propositions are representational enti-
ties. Besides having recourse to the ‘radical Russellian’ view of propositions as
concrete entities that we mentioned (and found implausible) earlier, one may
endorse a Fregean view whereby propositions are abstract entities that do not
stand in the correspondence relation to anything.20 Going one step further, one
could endorse the abovementioned identity theory of truth and deny the distinc-
tion between truth-makers and truth-bearers. To be sure, these are open possibili-
ties for propositionalists. Yet they are insufﬁcient for a more ambitious defence
of propositionalism, aiming to deﬁne the view in a way that is compatible with
20 This does not entail that propositions cannot be true or false – the idea is only that they can do with-
out a robust truth-maker. In this connection, consider Skorupski’s irrealist cognitivism. Skorupski denies
the existence of what he calls the reason-relation (which we referred to earlier to as the favouring rela-
tion), but he does not deny its actuality. For him the relation is irreal. As he puts it: “it is certainly true
that there are reason relations – there are three, to be exact, and none of them exist” (Skorupski,
2010, p. 428).
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Dancy’s speciﬁc assumptions. Dancy, as we saw, clearly maintains that there is a
strong distinction between truth-makers and truth-bearers, and in particular that
there is a signiﬁcant ontological difference between states of affairs, that are
(or can be) the case, and propositions, that can be true or false depending on the
way in which they relate to the former. These appear to be plausible claims that
propositionalism should attempt to preserve.
(ii) Another response, and indeed our favoured response, to RO appeals to
the role reasons play in practical deliberation, and goes as follows: it is obvi-
ous that what prompts us to act, or rather, to consider different ways of acting,
are (possibly putative) states of affairs; but what we consider, weigh, entertain
and face up to in practical reasoning are the propositions that represent those
states of affairs; we just do not have a direct connection to states of affairs,
and can only get to them through the propositions that represent them, which
we can clearly grasp (as Frege, 1918, pointed out). In light of this, the idea
emerges that there is no way we can do without propositions: they are indeed
transparent, representational entities in the sense above; however, although
they are representational, they do not fall out in our quest for reasons – on the
contrary, they are exactly the kind of things we look for when we try to indi-
viduate our reasons for acting. Putting it more simply, one can argue that RO
is not an objection to propositionalism, as that propositions are representa-
tional and yet (can) play the role of reasons is exactly what the propositional-
ist claims.
One may retort that what we are describing above is ordinary practical delib-
eration that involves motivating reasons only, whereas RO concerns normative
reasons. But this would be wrong: the above view of the primary function of
normative reasons can also accommodate motivating reasons. This is because
there are two kinds of practical deliberation: good (sound) and bad (unsound).
While only the former employs normative reasons, it remains the case that both
types of deliberation have the same kind of things as their premises. In unsound
practical deliberation, one reasons from that p to action (or whatever else one
takes the conclusion of reasoning to be) and the same is true of sound delibera-
tion – the only difference being in truth-value, i.e., in the (non-)existence of the
p fact. Now, all we need to answer RO is the claim that normative reasons are
propositional premises of sound reasoning (i.e., they are belief-contents)21 and
one can, although need not, extend this to motivating reasons. This means to
21 This view of reasons bears clear afﬁnity to the so-called reasoning view of reasons (see Setiya,
2014; Way, forthcoming; Silverstein, 2016) – although that view is intended to be an account of norma-
tive reasons only.
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hold that motivating reasons too are premises of this sort, albeit they might be
premises of unsound reasoning.22
Another challenge would be constituted by the claim that, in order to deliber-
ate, we do need to be able to think about reasons, but from this it does not follow
that reasons are what we think.23 More strongly, employing a distinction with
some historical pedigree,24 one may contend that reasons are the objects of our
thoughts, not their contents; but propositions can only be the contents of our
thoughts. How exactly the content/object distinction applies in the present case,
however, is far from clear. More importantly, that reasons cannot be identical to
the contents of our thoughts and beliefs is exactly the point at issue. And, even if
from the fact that we need to think about reasons it does not follow that reasons
are the contents of our thoughts, the propositionalist can (and is likely to) insist
that there are grounds for thinking that reasons are in fact identical to what we
think – even if not necessarily so.25
While the foregoing appears sufﬁcient for claiming that, like TO, RO does not
represent a lethal objection to propositionalism, it must also be acknowledged
that we now seem to have arrived at a crossroads, with two, more or less equally
respectable, paths in front of us. For, even if one is not forced to agree with the
statist claim that reasons must be states of affairs, and it is possible to say instead
that it is the things that (may) represent such items in our mind that do the real
work and thus qualify as reasons, no conclusive, or at least clearly compelling,
argument seems to be forthcoming either way. After all, what we have painted
here are two alternative visions of reasons and what they do. In other words,
although we may have found a response both to TO and RO that bears the marks
we wanted it to have,26 we have not really advanced in a positive way in either
22 This also means that the alternative picture of reasons on which our propositionalism relies also has
a natural place for UR. Yet, as we pointed out already, this does not mean that UR plays an essential role
in our response to RO. Instead, what happens is that our response puts forward an alternative vision of
reasons’ role and function and UR may, but need not, drop out of this as a natural consequence.
23 Everson (2009, p. 25) makes this point explicitly. The same idea seems to be expressed by Searle
(2001, p. 36).
24 The clearest expression of the distinction is probably in Twardowski (1977).
25 We say more about the role of the content/object distinction in Morganti and Tanyi (ms), where we argue
that it should be explicitly endorsed by Dancy. There, however, we also claim that endorsing the distinction is
far from an unproblematic move for Dancy and for all statists who agree with his basic assumptions.
26 In particular, we have not given up UR, nor have we modiﬁed the ontological picture Dancy has of
propositions and states of affairs. There is the question whether our alternative picture of reasons intends
to be a constitutive account of reasons (as the reasoning view does; see n. 21). In this case, we would not
be respecting Dancy’s primitivism and his particularism since they hold that not all items that ﬁgure in
reasoning are actually reasons (see Dancy, 2004a, ch. 2; cf. Dancy, 2006b, p. 2). However, we do not
think that we must be committed to a constitutive reading since all we need to hold to answer RO is that
normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning (in fact, perhaps only that they must be able to serve
as such premises), not that premises are reasons.
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direction. In the next, ﬁnal substantial section of the article, we will elaborate on
this and try to present additional considerations in favour of propositionalism.
5. The Challenge of Illusionary Reasons
As we saw, the main intuition pulling towards statism is that reasons are things
that obtain in the world. Yet not all reasons can unquestionably be identiﬁed with
obtaining states of affairs – especially so in the case of motivating reasons. More
speciﬁcally, in the statist scenario the agent can falsely believe s/he has a reason
to act, i.e., s/he can have a wrong reason, in two ways: either (i) by having a false
belief about the obtaining of certain states of affairs in the world (like, for exam-
ple, when I go to look for a doctor because I think a person is injured, while s/he
is perfectly ﬁne and is simply wearing a Halloween mask), or (ii) by having a
false belief about whether the relevant relation between a state of affairs and the
(properties of the) relevant action obtains (like, for example, when the person I
see is actually injured, and because of that, I go to look for a pet jellyﬁsh that has
no curative power whatsoever). In the ﬁrst case, one may speak of an ‘illusionary’
reason; in the second, of a ‘bad’ reason.
When it comes to bad reasons, statists and propositionalists are more or less on
a par. For, granted that an agent has a false belief regarding whether a normative
relation holds between a state of affairs that obtains and (the property of ) an
action, nothing deﬁnite seems to follow from this with respect to whether that
state of affairs or, rather, the proposition representing it qualiﬁes as the agent’s
reason.
Think, however, about reasons that are wrong in the other sense,
i.e., illusionary reasons. Consider the case, say, in which I go to the shop to
buy beer believing that there is no beer in the fridge, while there is in fact beer
in the fridge. The statist, it seems to us, has a hard time making sense of this.
For it looks as though s/he can only say that there is in fact no reason for me
to go to the shop intending to buy beer, since there is no corresponding (obtain-
ing) state of affairs. However, it seems natural to hold instead that I do have a
reason for going to the shop: after all, I felt and thought I had a precise reason
to go and buy beer, and indeed a rather good one! The propositionalist, on the
other hand, does not incur any such fault. On their theory, wrong reasons
(of the illusionary type) are false propositions, while good reasons are true pro-
positions. But, unlike non-obtaining states of affairs, false propositions are not
ontologically different from true ones. Both true and false propositions exist,
and what distinguishes them from one another is whether they correctly repre-
sent the world. In view of this, one may suggest that the amount of unity guar-
anteed by propositionalism is higher than that provided by statism – with the
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latter having the deﬁnitely non-negligible drawback that, as a matter of fact, not
all reasons can be identiﬁed with entities that are part of the world. Hence, if,
as we do in this article following Dancy, UR is assumed to be in place, it is
more plausible to think that practical reasons are (in all cases) propositions,
rather than that they are (in all cases) states of affairs.27
Before closing, though, let us brieﬂy consider other lines of defence that may
be available for the statist who, like Dancy, endorses UR.
A ﬁrst response is that the ‘acted for the reason that …’ context is intensional,
and therefore carries no referential weight, hence existential commitment, with
itself. Even if one allows that ‘he acted for the reason that p’ can be converted to
‘the reason for which he acted was that p’, that is, one may be saying something
about the agent and nothing else. While we agree with this, it must be stressed
that the reasons we are considering for and against statism and propositionalism
are not primarily connected to linguistic considerations. The claim is that if we
take reason talk to refer to entities external to the agent that ground his/her
actions and/or the normative features of the actions s/he does or might do, it is
not obvious that these entities ought to be states of affairs, and may in fact be
plausibly identiﬁed with propositions.28
Second, the statist might attempt to save the day by taking on some further
metaphysical commitments. Setting aside the identity theory of truth that we dis-
cussed earlier, one option would be to adopt a more encompassing notion of real-
ity as including non-existent entities (Parsons, 1980, who explicitly refers to
Meinong, 1960) or, analogously, a broader notion of existence that comprises the
objects of false beliefs and non-obtaining states of affairs (Plantinga, 1974).
However, this would obviously represent a relevant additional cost for the stat-
ist, especially so from Dancy’s point of view. Indeed, despite his reference to
non-factive explanations and to scenarios in which states of affairs act as reasons
in spite of their failure to obtain, Dancy does not believe in the existence of non-
obtaining states of affairs.29 And this is not surprising, given that his main moti-
vation for subscribing to statism is that reasons must be ‘the right sort of beast’,
i.e., concrete entities.
27 Thus, we are only making a conditional claim to the effect that if UR is assumed, then proposition-
alism is preferable to statism. Notice, at any rate, that even if one dropped UR, error cases together with
the arguments in the previous sections would still make statism weaker than propositionalism in a clear
methodological sense, for statists would in any case have to restrict their account to normative reasons
only, while propositionalism would also be able to cover motivating reasons.
28 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
29 In fact, he rejects White’s (1972) idea that beliefs can have non-obtaining but existing states of
affairs as contents on the ground that this view is insufﬁciently realist about true beliefs. See Dancy
(2000, pp. 147–148).
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At this point, the statist could argue that false beliefs also have objects,
although only in the minimal sense that we can answer the question what they
are about, and not in the sense that there is something corresponding to them
in the world.30 Second, the statist could point out that error cases all concern
actions that were done for illusionary reasons, but they are still actions that
can be explained (by referring to motivating reasons). This is the abovemen-
tioned idea of non-factive explanations. Finally, s/he could contend that the
apparently problematic cases are in fact all cases in which reasons appear in
the accounts we provide for our actions but, strictly speaking, there are in fact
no reasons present out there, neither normative nor motivating (see,
e.g., Alvarez, 2010).
However, it seems to us that, whatever one makes of this, the challenge of illu-
sionary reasons is in any case answered more effectively by propositionalism, as
the latter does not incur the high price of each of the moves just illustrated – be it
in terms of beliefs having merely intentional objects, actions not corresponding to
anything counting as the reason for them, or what have you. Moreover, it must be
noted here that (with the exception of non-factive explanations) Dancy explicitly
argues against the above views.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The main aim of this article was to contribute to the debate about the ontology of
practical reasons (motivating as well as normative) – in particular, with respect to
the dispute between the view (a) that they are states of affairs, and the view
(b) that they are propositions – by clarifying the relevant issues and making at
least some of the key assumptions and arguments explicit. We focused on the
most direct considerations against propositionalism and in favour of statism that
can be found in the literature, i.e., Dancy’s, which we have tried to expand upon
and turn into full-blown arguments. We concluded that a careful consideration of
these arguments does not lead towards statism, and instead essentially points to
nothing but a clash of fundamental visions of what reasons are and what role they
play. Then, on the basis of additional considerations, we concluded with a tenta-
tive positive suggestion: namely, that, if anything, in view of the possibility of
certain actions done for reasons that are ‘illusionary’, it is really propositionalism
that should be deemed more appealing than statism, at least to the extent that one
endorses the idea that motivating and normative reasons must (or are likely to) be
30 Crane (2001) seems to make this point when he says that intentional objects are schematic: they
need not be full-blown objects of any kind.
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the same sort of entities, and consequently discards pluralist views of the ontol-
ogy of practical reasons.
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